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NATURE OF CASE 
This Is a divorce action. 
:•• PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before Judge Con .ier or reb:~ -.r*- J O J . 
A iMemo I ' l n d m i l P t . ' i J i a l U l l Wi.i. j . ' . d . r : -:' u . : , ~2 r . " 
F i n d i n g s of F a c t s , J ^ n c J S I O P S ~f Law ire Dec ree or D i v o r c e were 
s i g n e d A p r i l 3u, 1^6 ~- :-* 
T r i a l and Amendment o i , e c : e t ^z d i v o r c e o e e ^ m g r e u ^ s c r u j * i . .- * 
of t h e e q u i t y i n t h e r e s i d e n c e of tine p a r t i e s was u e n i e d oy Order 
d a t e d I la5 3J , 193 5 (I ) 
Whether t h e t r i a l 'T'onrt e r r e d in a w a r d i n g t h e e n t i r e e q u i t y 
i n t e r e s t i n t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e : : l i e p a r t i e s of --ie r la lined 
a n a d i d HOC e s c a o ! , i s h m e v a i a e of che e q u i t y . 
Award of *-.he na ^ - " !3se r *-" ~h? ? a r : ' . e s m a m a i e s t a i e , 
c j-n'p. .-^-... J .'.v .-., -- .'. i . i o : .:. • e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e 
of cue p a r t i e s . 1, I-Lai:: c i f f 1.= s<- d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e u n d e r i r e 
f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s of c h i s c a s e t o :•" • ' - : . . 1 * - -
t r i b u t i o n c o n t r a r y +-0 e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s an-i D U D a a r d s s^r oy 
t h e C o u r t , 
Whether 1 li*-> r 4 _I.II • ,t 1 In ' -M.M 1 r ..MI I t-. inai* e 1 t Lading .'. 
and t o e s t a b l i s h t h e v a l u e of t h e e q u i t y i n t e r e s t in t h e m a r i t a l ;•' 
residence constitutes error and abuse of discretion where a 
question was raised as to the value of the equity interest in 
the marital residence and the Court's distribution of that asset. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A copy of the trial Court's Memorandum Decision, Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce are attached 
as Addendum 1 and 2 respectively. A copy of Defendant's Motion 
for New Trial is attached as Addendum 3. 
The parties married June 27, 1977. (T. 45, L. 21) This was 
a second marriage for each. One (1) child resulted from this 
marriage, Jason, age 7. (T. 45-46, L. 22-1). Three (3) other 
children of Plaintiff from her former marriage, Isha, Jeremiah 
and Justin (twins) were adopted by Defendant. (T. 41, L. 2-12) 
The parties separated some time in June, 1984 due to problems in 
the marriage connected with Plaintiff's association with another 
man, denied by her. (T. 47, 21-23; T. 72, L. 7-24; T. 172, L. 5) 
Plaintiff filed her action for divorce July 12, 1984. A Decree 
of Divorce was entered April 30, 1985. (R. 121-125). Plaintiff 
made no claim for alimony. (T. 50, L. 4 5) She remarried in May, 198 5. 
Prior to the marriage, Defendant owned an interest in a 
home at 920 McClelland, Salt Lake City, Utah. (T. 89, L. 10-15; 
T. 14 7, L. 18-24) The parties lived in this home from the time 
they were married until early January, 1978, when they moved into 
the home at 2315 Sheridan Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, purchased 
from Plaintiff's father. (Ex. D-7 attached as Addendum 4; T. 88, 
L. 12-19; T. 89, L. 16-24; T. 147-149). The parties purchased 
the Sheridan Road home for $58,000.00. (Ex. D-7). The called 
for down payment of $3,000.00 was made by Defendant performing 
labor, by agreement with Plaintifffs father, (C. A. Persch) to 
put roofs on his and his son, Steve's, newly constructed homes. 
(T. 149, L. 5-25; T. 150, L. 1-3). The parties assumed payment 
of an existing mortgage owing to Valley Bank of $25,000.00 as 
part payment of the purchase price. Monthly payments were paid 
until separation of the parties. (T. 93, L. 18-25; T. 94, L. 13; 
T. 95, L. 1-24). Of the $328.00 monthly payment to Valley Bank, 
$258.00 came principally from the earnings of Defendant and 
$70.00 came from the payment to Plaintiff for property from her 
first marriage in her father's name. (T. 49, L. 17-21; T. 94, 
L. 13-18; T. 108-109, L. 18). The parties paid the annual 
property taxes and insurance on the Sheridan home until 1984 
when the divorce action was filed. (T. 95, L. 1-17; T. 174, 
L. 2-25; T. 19, L. 21-25). The balance of the purchase price of 
$30,000.00 was to be payable at the rate of $3,000.00 per year 
at eight (8%) percent interest. On December 25, 1978, Plaintiff's 
parents, C. A. Persch and Sharon Persch, reduced this remaining 
balance with a Christmas gift of $6,000.00 each. (Ex. D-8 
Addendum 4; T. 96, L. 14-25; T. 97, L. 23-25; T. 150, L. 8-52). 
At the time of this gift, the only obligation owing to 
Plaintiff's parents was the obligation for the purchase of 
the Sheridan Road home. (Ex. D-7; T. 98, L. 9-19; T. 113, L. 3-21; 
T. 114, L. 22; T. 115, L. 14, T. 117, L. 21; T. 120, L. 4) 
Defendant's income during the marriage ranged from a gross 
of $25,000.00 in 1980 to a gross of $34,400.00 in 1983. (See 
Ex. P-l, 80-83 tax returns; T. 112, L. 11-14) During 1982 and 
198 3 Defendant constructed improvements to the Sheridan Road home 
at a value of $30,000.00 for labor and materials. (T. 152-154;' 
T. 157, L. 13-25). Defendant testified, without contradiction, 
that the Sheridan Road home was in poor condition at the time it 
was purchased and they moved in. (T. 155-156). The Defendant 
testified that the purchase price of $58,000.00 was a fair price. 
(T. 157, L. 9-12) 
Each of the parties brought personal property into the 
marriage consisting mainly of furniture and appliances, which 
each essentially retained possession. (T. 50, L. 17-20; T. 171, 
L. 14-24). Plaintiff retained the $70.00 per month payments from 
property she owned before marriage and held for her by her father. 
(T. 49, L. 17-20) Plaintiff received the 1979 Dodge Ram Charger 
purchased during the marriage with funds received from the sale 
of Defendant's home, together with the majority of the furniture 
and appliances acquired during the marriage. (T. 174, L. 13-15; 
Ex. D-10; T. 169-171). 
Defendant sold his home at 9 20 McClelland and received 
$12,000.00 for his equity. (T. 147, L. 18-24; T. 174, L. 1-4) 
This money was used during the marriage for the down payment 
on the 1979 Dodge Ram Charger awarded Plaintiff ($4,000.00), 
payment of the annual property taxes on the Sheridan Road home, 
and to purchase an interest in the Bitner property ($3,000.00). 
(T. 174, L. 2-25). The Court awarded Defendant the interest in 
the Bitner property, subject to any existing indebtedness, the 
1981 Ford pickup truck purchased after separation, subject to 
the existing debt thereon, and his retirement account with 
Desk and Chairs, Inc. ($4,600.00), subject to Defendant holding 
Plaintiff harmless from and against any claim related thereto 
or arising therefrom. (R. 99-100; 123-125). The lower Court 
awarded all equity of the parties in the Sheridan Road home to 
Plaintiff, subject to her paying any and all obligations that 
the parties owed on the property, without a finding as to the 
value of the equity. (R. 99, 116, 123) The Court made no deter-
mination of whether the claimed equity in the Sheridan Road home 
was part of the marital estate and made no determination as to the 
legal rights that the parties had, if any, in the Sheridan Road 
home. (R. 99; T. 92, L. 7-10). 
Plaintiff, through out the trial, claimed the parties were 
renting the home at Sheridan Road and asserted that she claimed 
no interest in the Sheridan Road property. (T. 84-87) Plaintiff 
admitted and acknowledged that she signed Exhibit D-7 at or 
about the time the parties moved into Sheridan Road. (T. 87, L.7-24; 
T. 88, L. 2-19; T. 94-95; T. 106," L. 7-24) However, when Plaintiff 
was asked if she would have any objection to the home or any 
interest in the home being awarded to Defendant, she stated: 
"Yes, because he didn't pay for the house-" (T." 107, L. 2-25; 
T. 108, L. 1-4). Even though Plaintiff claimed no interest in 
the Sheridan Road property, she was not waiving any interest in 
the property. (T. 110, L. 5-19)- Near the end of the trial, 
Plaintiff again testified why she believed she had no interest 
in the Sheridan Road property and stated, "we never put a down 
payment on it and we lived there for 7 years• January 1st of 
every year, a lump sum was supposed to been given to my father. 
Thatfs never been done; and the house has never been put in our 
name. We didn't have a chance to put it in our name and I don't 
want to refinance." (T. 202, L. 7-14) This testimony was given 
by Plaintiff without any contradiction to the claim of Defendant 
that he made the down payment on the home by putting roofs on 
the new homes of her father and her brother and that the lump sum 
payment for the first four (4) years was gifted to them by her 
parents as evidenced by Exhibit D-8. Plaintiff also testified 
that as part of her belief that she had no interest in the 
Sheridan Road property was due to the fact she claimed taxes for 
the past two (2) years had not been paid and were always delinquent 
and that Defendant had refused to refinance the home some time 
after 1978 because to do so would require a higher monthly payment 
that they couldn't afford. (T. 203-205) This testimony is also 
contradicted by the tax returns presented as Exhibit 1 by Plaintiff 
and references to the transcript cited above in this Statement 
of Facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The failure of the lower Court to exercise its discretionary 
powers in accordance with the standards set by the Utah Supreme 
Court is error. 
To award the entire equity interest in the marital residence 
to Plaintiff is so disproportionate and inequitable that it 
constitutes a clear abuse of discretion and is contrary to the 
principles of equity. 
Defendant's argument is based primarily on the recent cases 
of Olson v. Olson, 15, Ut. Adv. Rep. 8, Berger v. Berger, 14, Ut. 
Adv. Rep. 4, and Jones v. Jones, Utah 700 P.2d 1772, which require 
the Court to determine the value of property at the time of the 
Decree of Divorce, make express findings where one of the parties 
to a property distribution raises a serious question as to the 
value of one or more of the assets and the trial Court1s distribution 
of those assets. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT'S FAILURE TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STANDARD SET BY THE SUPREME 
COURT IS ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ERROR. 
In a divorce proceeding, there is no fixed formula upon which 
to determine division of property. The trial Court is given 
broad discretion to make whatever disposition of property as it 
deems fair, equitable and necessary for the protection and welfare 
of the parties. Turner v. Turner, Utah, 64 9 P.2d 6 (198 2); 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d 218 (1980). However, in 
dividing property between divorcing spouses, the trial Court is 
governed by general principles of equity and must exercise its 
discretion in accordance with the standards set by the Utah 
Supreme Court. U.C.A. 30-3-5 (1984ed), Jones v. Jones, Utah 
700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (1985); Land v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 
(1980). Each case must be determined on their own set of circum-
stances and in making a property division in a divorce action 
the trial Court may properly consider such things as the length 
of the marriage, the parties respective contributions to the 
marriage, the assets brought into the marriage, and the contributions 
of each party in obtaining marital property. Turner v. Turner, 
Utah, (supra); Preston v. Preston, Utah 646 P.2d 705 (1982); 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d 326 (1980); Jackson v. 
Jackson, Utah, 617 P.2d 338 (1980). 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts herein, Defendant 
owned an interest in a home before he married Plaintiff. This 
home was sold and the proceeds he received were used in the 
marriage as a down payment on the purchase of the 19 79 Dodge 
Ram Charger awarded to Plaintiff, paid the real property taxes 
on the Sheridan Road marital home and purchased an interest in 
land in Summit County, referred to as the Bitner property. All 
that Defendant received from this premarital asset was the interest 
in the Bitner property, subject to all claims and indebtedness 
owing thereon. (T. 147, L. 18-24; T. 174, L. 1-25; R. 99-100; 
123-125) The indebtedness on the Bitner property was represented 
to be $2,667.00 by Plaintiff's father, C. A. Persch, in his 
deposition. (See Depo. page 27-34; Ex. D-9) The net equity 
value in the Bitner property was calculated to be $666.00. 
(Ex. D-9) Conversly, Plaintiff retained all interest in the 
property she had before marriage, held in her father's name for 
her. (T. 85) The record does not indicate that the trial Court 
considered this property as part of the marital estate, although 
it should have, without regard in whose name the property was 
held. The lower Court is required under the existing Utah case 
law, to consider all property interests of the parties to be part 
of the marital estate. Jesperson v. Jesperson (supra). Property 
divisions are to be made according to equitable principals and 
not merely according to legal title. Rogers v. Rogers, Utah, 
671 P.2d 160 (1983). 
The equity interest in the Sheridan Road marital home was 
acquired by purchase during the marriage. Defendant's contributions 
to acquiring and maintaining this property as set forth in the 
Statement of Facts herein was substantially greater than those 
of Plaintiff, to-wit: (1) performed labor for the down payment; 
(2) remodeled the home; (3) $258.00 of each month's mortgage 
payment came from his earnings; (4) used a portion of the proceeds 
received from the sale of his premarital property to pay the 
property taxes on Sheridan Road. Plaintiff's contributions con-
sisted mainly of payment of $70.00 per month on the monthly 
mortgage payments to Valley Bank and a joint gift from her parents 
of $12,000.00, $6,000.00 to Plaintiff and $6,000.00 to Defendant. 
(Ex. D-8) In Preston v. Preston, Utah, 646 P.2d 705 (1982) it 
was recognized that a husband should be given credit for con-
tributions made from the sale of assets owned prior to marriage 
to assets acquired during the marriage, together with a portion 
of the appreciation in value attributable to such contributions. 
In Berger v. Berger (supra), the trial Court attempted to divide 
marital property sixty (60%) percent to the wife because of her 
contributions in the marriage and forty (4 0%) percent to the 
husband. In this case, it can be said that an equitable distribution 
of the equity interest in the Sheridan Road marital home in view 
of the contributions made by each of the parties would be fifty-
fifty, as proposed and advocated by Defendant at the time of trial. 
(T. 165; Ex. D-9) 
The Defendant, by his Motion for new trial, and to modify 
the Decree of Divorce, raised a question as to the value of the 
equity in and to the Sheridan Road marital residence. The 
Court denied this Motion and made no determination of whether the 
claimed equity in the Sheridan Road marital home was a part of 
the marital estate; made no determination as to the legal rights 
that the parties had, if any, in the Sheridan Road home; and 
awarded all of the equity in the Sheridan Road home to Plaintiff, 
subject to her paying any and all obligations that the parties 
owed on the property without a finding as to the value of 
the equity. These facts are covered in the Statement of Facts 
at pages 2 through 6. Recent cases of Olson v. Olson, 15 Ut. Adv. 
Rep. 8, Berger v. Berger, 14 Ut. Adv. Rep 4 and Jones v. Jones, 
Utah, 700 P.2d 1772, enunciated that where, as in this case, one 
of the parties to property distributed raises a serious question 
as to the value of one or more of the assets, the trial Courtfs 
distribution of those assets should be based upon written Findings 
of Fact that will permit appellat review. In Jones v. Jones (supra), 
this Court mandated that the trial Court must exercise its 
discretionary powers in accordance with the standards that have 
been set by the Supreme Court. In this case, as in Jones, there 
was no finding of fact of the value of the equity interest of the 
parties in the Sheridan Road marital home. Defendant testified 
at trial tha- his estimate of the market value of the home was 
$110,000.00. (T. 164). Defendant determined the equity existing 
at that time to be $85,000.00 and proposed that the Court divide 
the equity interest equally between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
(T. 163; Ex. D-9). The failure of the trial Court to comply with 
this mandated standard warrants reversal and modification of 
the Decree of Divorce to award Defendant an equal share of the 
equity interest in the Sheridan Road marital home. 
POINT II 
THE AWARD OF THE ENTIRE EQUITY INTEREST IN THE 
MARITAL RESIDENCE TO PLAINTIFF IS AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION IN THAT TO DO SO IS AN INEQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES, CONTRARY TO PRINCIPLES OF 
EQUITY AND THE STANDARDS SET BY THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT. 
Where it is clear that the trial Court's award of all of 
the equity in the marital residence is not based upon express 
findings as to the value of the equity interest, so as to guide 
the reviewing Court, those findings are not entitled to deference. 
DeRose v. DeRose, 19 U.2d 77,79, 426 P.2d 21,22 (1967); BoaIs 
v. Boals, Utah, 664 P.2d 1191 (1983); and Pennington v. Pennington, 
16 Ut. Adv. Rep- 5, (1985). 
Although a presumption of validity is placed on the trial 
Court's actions in divorce cases and the burden is upon Appellant 
to show error, divorce cases being in equity, this Court is free 
to review both the law and the facts. (Utah Const. Art. VIII 
Sec. 9) As stated in Berger v. Berger (supra), the reviewing 
Court will over turn the trial Court's judgment where there has 
been a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error or where there has been such 
an abuse of discretion that an inequity or injustice has resulted. 
To award Plaintiff all the equity in the Sheridan Road marital 
residence, is such an abuse of discretion. To do so awards to 
Plaintiff a disproportionate amount of the marital assets equal 
to 92% and to Defendant 8% without regard to contributions made 
in acquiring and maintaining the property and the obligations 
ordered to be assumed by Defendant. (T. 121, 130, 131). 
Plaintiff's father, Mr. Persch, testified that FDC/D&C has claims 
against Mr. Hermansen of $30,000.00 to $4 0,000.00. Whether in 
fact these claims exist and can be proved, casts serious doubt 
as to the value of the pension/retirement awarded Defendant. The 
distribution of property by the Decree with the values that were 
set forth in the Findings of Fact is as follows: (See R. 113; 
also Ex. D-9 attached as Addendum 5). 
COURT'S AWARD 
TO PLAINTIFF 
Sheridan Road equity 
(Ex. D-9; T. 164) 
1979 Dodge 
(R. 113) 
Furniture, etc. 
(Ex. D-9) 
Total: 
35,000.00 
1,130.00 
4,615.00 
$ 90,753.00 
TO DEFENDANT 
Bitner property (net) 666.00 
(Ex. D-9) 
1981 Ford pickup 
(R. 113) 
no equity 
2,170.00 
D&C Pension/Retirement 4,6 53.00 
Furniture, etc. 
(Ex. D-9) 
$ 7,489.40 
Defendant merged the majority of the proceeds he received 
from the sale of his premarital home into the marital property, 
except for the Bitner property. The facts and circumstances of 
this case dictate that there should be an equal (50/50) division 
of the equity interest in the Sheridan Road marital residence 
when compared with the facts and circumstances of Jesperson v. 
Jesperson (supra), Berger v. Berger (supra). The Defendant 
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entered into the marriage owning an interest in a home. He 
leaves the marriage without any interest in the marital home. 
Plaintiff entered the marriage with an interest in real property 
which she retained. She leaves the marriage with the entire equity 
interest in the marital home purchased during the marriage. 
Compensating factors do not exist in this case which could justify 
a division of the marital property of 92% to Plaintiff and 8% to 
Defendant. (See Workman v. Workman, Utah, 652 P.2d 931 [1982], 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, [supra], Turner v. JTurner (supra)f' 
In the context of Preston v. Preston (supra) and Georgedes v. 
Georgedes, Utah, 627 P.2d 44 (1981) • It would not be unreasonable 
to have allowed Defendant the equivalent of his contributions to 
the marriage from premarital assets and his direct contributions 
to acquiring and maintaining the Sheridan Road marital home. 
These contributions are set forth in the Statement of Facts 
contained in this Brief and consist of $7,000.00 premarital, 
$3,000.00 labor for down payment, $30,000.00 for remodeling the 
home and two-thirds (2/3) of the Valley Bank mortgage reduction 
of $12,000.00 for a total contribution of $52,000.00. These 
amounts do not include the gift of $6,000.00 from Plaintifffs 
parents. (See Ex. D-8) 
Where the trial Court failed to accomplish the essential 
objective of a fair and equitable division of property according 
to the demands of justice and standards set by the Supreme Court, 
the Decree of Divorce should be modified to award Defendant an 
equitable portion of the equity interest in the Sheridan Road 
marital home. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court failed to make a division of marital property 
on a fair, reasonable and equitable basis• To award Plaintiff 
92% of the marital property, where compensating factors do not 
exist to justify such a disproportionate division, it is a clear 
abuse of discretion and error. The lower Court failed to exercise 
its discretionary powers in accordance with the standards that 
have been set by the Utah Supreme Court when it failed to make 
an express finding as to the value of the equity interest in the 
marital residence. The Court should modify the Decree of Divorce 
to award Defendant one-half (1/2) of the equity interest in the 
Sheridan Road marital home in view of the substantial contributions 
made by Defendant in acquiring and maintaining this property 
interest. 
Respectfully submitted 
iIPHRAIM H. FAftKHAUSER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
! r H 'Vi f . - , > 
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MAR 3 1S85 
I N THE D I S T R I C T COURT OF SALT L A K E COUNTY,H. Q.xon^dnsy, <2<Sk/rcl Olat dnirt 
By' 
STATE OF U T A H . ^ ~ Z 7 t D e p u t y Clerk 
WENDY LYNN HERMANSEN, : 
PI aintif f
 9 : Memorandum Decision 
vs : Civil No.D84-2532 
TERRY W. HERMANSEN, : 
Defendant. : 
This court having heard the evidence and reviewed the 
memorandums submitted by the respective parties determines 
the issues as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a decree o-f divorce -from 
the defendant to become final upon entry. 
2. Plaintiff is granrted the custody of the minor 
children subject to the defendant's right of reasonable 
visitation rights with the said children. Defendant is 
ordered to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $150.00 p&r month 
per child for the support and maintenance of the children. 
3. Each party is awarded two children (alternating by 
age) as allowable dependents for income tax purposes. 
4. Both parties are ordered to carry health, dental and 
accident insurance upon each of the children where it is 
available at the place of employment of each of the 
respective party. Any excess medical expenses shall be borne 
equally by the parties. 
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5. Defendant is awarded limited visitation with the 
children only under supervision. Defendant is permitted 
phone visitation with each o-f the children as the child is 
willing to communicate. 
6. Whatever equity the parties own in the home at 2315 
Sheridan Road is awarded to the plaintiff subject to the 
plaintiff paying any and all obligations that the parties owe 
on said property and holding the defendant harmless 
therefrom. This court makes no determination as to the legal 
rights that the parties have, if any, in the real estate. 
7. The Bitner property is awarded to the defendant, 
subject to his paying any and all obligations thereon and 
holding the plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
8. Plaintiff is awarded the 1979 Dodge Ram Charger, 
subject to any debt thereon which the plaintiff is to assume 
and pay and to hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
9- Defendant is awarded the 19S1 Ford pick up subject 
to any debt thereon which the defendant is to assume and pay 
and to hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
10. The retirement account at FDC/D&C is awarded to the 
defendant and he is ordered to hold plaintiff harmless from 
any claim arising from said account. 
11- All furniture and furnishings arts divided between 
the parties as set forth in Exhibit 9 on file herein, 
including the seperate property owned by the parties before 
their marriage, (see "Schedule of Furniture and Personal 
Property", sections I, II, and III.) 
12- All maritial debts are to be assumed and paid by 
each o-F the respective parties as set forth in Exhibit 10 on 
file herein. 
13. All photos acquired during marriage are to be 
divided equally between the parties. The parties will flip a 
coin to see who get to make the first selection and then the 
other makes a selection until all of the photos are chosen. 
Once all of the photos are selected, the party desiring a 
copy of the photo in possession of the other party shall pay 
for the cost of making the copy. 
14. Plaintiff is granted a judgment against the 
defendant for arrearage in the sum of $1200.00 thru January, 
1985. 
15. Defendant is ordered to return to Jason the bicycle 
belonging to Jason. 
16. The Do>tey painting is awarded to the defendant. 
17. Plaintiff's maiden name of Persch is awarded to 
her. 
13. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own costs 
and expenses of litigation. 
19. Each party is restrained and enjoined from 
harassing, annoying or in any way from interfering with the 
other. 
20. Plaintiff is ordered to prepare the necessary 
Findings, Conclusions and Decree in accordance herewith. 
v 
Dated t h i s _£ day of March, 1985. 
Dean HtT^onder, D i s t r i c t JixJgeT'' " ^TT^Sf ^ X 0 
Copy to be mailed to each counsel , ttJXtiM^*%&; 
*'' : 0 n» ;:»M * OFFICE 
Gary L. Paxton A2548 %"* ' ' w' 'ITAH 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON U.y ij Q ** lu *ar 
Attorneys for Plaintiff nAT ,H 3 » W 93 
77 West 200 South, Suite 200 H. 01 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WENDY LYNN HERMANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TERRY W. HERMANSEN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. D84-2532 
THIS ACTION came on regularly for trial before the Honorable 
Dean E. Conder, District Judge, on February 21, 1985, at the hour 
of 10:00 o'clock a.m. The parties were present and represented by 
their counsels of record, Gary L. Paxton and E. H. Fankhauser. 
Thereupon, preliminary statements were made to the Court after 
which Plaintiff and witnesses on her behalf were called to testify 
and cross-examined and exhibits were admitted into evidence after 
which she rested. Defendant then testified on his own behalf and 
additional exhibits were admitted into evidence and he rested. 
The Court then announced certain findings and invited the parties 
to submit written proposals for resolution of the remaining issues 
joined in the action, and the parties having submitted memoranda 
and the Court having reviewed the same and having considered the 
evidence introduced at trial and, having issued its Memorandum 
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Decision, and now being deemed fully advised in the premises and 
good cause appearing, makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was an actual and bona fide resident of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, at the time of commencement of this 
action and she had been for more than three (3) months immediately 
prior thereto, 
2. More than ninety (90) days has elapsed since the filing 
of the Complaint. 
3. The parties were married to each other near Oakley, 
Summit County, Utah, on June 27, 1977 and ever since have been 
husband and wife. 
4. The parties are parents of four (4) minor children, the 
youngest of whom, Jason Hermansen, is the issue of this marriage. 
The parties1 other three (3) children, Isha, Jeremiah and Justin 
Hermansen, are Plaintiff's natural children who have been legally 
adopted by Defendant. 
5. During the marriage the Defendant treated the Plaintiff 
cruelly, causing her great mental distress in that he argued 
unreasonably with her and criticized her without cause. 
6. The parties separated in July 1984. Since that time 
there has occurred emotional and psychological stress and conflict 
between the parties, particularly with regard to their daughter, 
Isha, of a nature and to the extent that the Court finds there is 
no expectation whatever that the parties could reconcile their 
differences and the Court finds that it would be in the best 
:, PRATT, 
Sc CAHOON 
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interest of Plaintiff and the parties' children to make the decree 
in this action final upon entry, 
7. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be awarded the 
custody of the parties' minor children and the Court finds the 
children's best interests would be served by awarding their cus-
tody to Plaintiff. 
8. The Court finds that under the circumstances existing at 
this time with regard to the emotional stress and conflict between 
the parties and the children, it would be in the children's best 
interest to limit Defendant's visitation to supervised visits to 
be conducted at the offices of the Division of Family Services. 
9. Plaintiff is presently employed full-time at Furniture 
Distribution Center at a wage rate of $6.0Q/hour. Her proffer of 
her Financial Declaration's statement of monthly expenses as her 
testimony regarding the reasonble and necessary costs of maintain-
ing herself and the parties' children was accepted by the Court. 
Health insurance is available to Plaintiff through her employer 
which is presently in force for the benefit of herself and the 
children at a cost to her of approximately $130/month. 
10. Defendant is presently employed as a foreman with Bartile 
Roofs, Inc., from which employment he realizes an average net, 
monthly income of $1,098.00. He is also paid a truck and tool 
allowance of $200-275/month by his employer for the use of his 
vehicle and tools on Bartile jobs. In the near future health 
insurance will be made available to Defendant by his employer 
which could cover the parties' children. 
3LYDE, PRATT, 
IBBS dt CAHOON 
T T O R N E Y S AT L A W 
I AMERICAN S A V I N G S 
PLAZA 
WEST S E C O N D S O U T H 
SALT LAKE CITY, - 3 - A d d e n d u m 2 , P a g e 3 
>• <4 try 
f 
r 
9\ 
:, PRATT, 
fe CAHOON 
:YS AT LAW 
CAN SAVINGS 
.AZA 
ICOND SOUTH 
*KE CITY, 
i 8410! 
11• Between January 1978 and their separation, the parties 
resided in a home at 2315 Sheridan Read, Salt Lake City, Utahc> 
ovnod -bf=^^s±ziL uCX-J^ ^^ dL'gnb-s, During the period of that occupancy 
the parties did certain remodeling, paid some property taxes and 
made the $328 monthly payments on a Valley Bank encumbrance 
against the property. $70 of each monthly payment to Valley Bank 
was made with Plaintiff's separate funds. No evidence, was"^admit-
ted at 'trial as fc-a the presentNtair market valu^ of said iseal pro-
perty or cite increasexin its value", if any, attributable to any 
remodeling. 
12. During the marriage Defendant and Plaintiff's brother, 
Steve Persch, obtained ffQ£~s£h^£^ Plain-
tiff's father's company, Furniture Distribution Center, an 
interest in certain unimproved real property located at Park City, 
Utah, identified as the Bitner property. Defendant claimed to 
have paid $3,000 for that property interest. 
13. During the marriage the parties acquired certain items 
of personal property which they owned at the time of trial, 
including, but not limited to: a 1979 Dodge Ramcharger, fair 
market value of approximately $2,000.00 subject to a Valley Bank 
lien of $862.00; a 1981 Ford pickuip, the value of which is not 
materially in excess of the Zions Bank lien against it; certain 
furniture, furnishings, appliances and firearms identified in 
Exhibit D-9; family photographs; a painting by Doxey which cost 
$500.00 for which no present value testimony was presented; and, a 
vested pension account with Desk & Chairs, Inc., a Utah corpora-
tion, of approximately $4,600.00. 
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14. Each party owned the following items of personal proper-
ty prior to their marriage which properties have not lost their 
separate property character: 
Plaintiff's: Refrigerator, Zenith TV, sofa and coffee 
table, antique dining room set with chairs, 410 shotgun 
and .22 cal. pistol. 
Defendant fs: Furniture in possession, 12 ga. shotgun, 
12 ga. Remington shotgun and .22 cal. auto pistol. 
15. At the time of trial, the following debts and 
obligations were outstanding against the parties, or either of 
them: Valley Bank (Ramcharger lien); Valley Bank-Visa Card 
(Plaintiff's attorney's fees and children's clothes, $686); Utah 
Bank and Trust (1983 income tax loan); Zions Bank (1981 Ford truck 
lien, $6,200); Mervyn's (children's clothes and miscellaneous 
family expenses, $700); Bryner Clinic, ($50), Salt Lake Clinic, 
($200), Salt Lake Surgical Center ($65) and Drs. Bennion, Allred 
and Ring/Wong (children's medical expenses); Dr. Borgoyne (marital 
counselling, $185); and, IRS (1983 income tax assessment $28). 
16. Any debts other than those identified in Paragraph 15, 
above, incurred by either party after their separation in July 
1984, are the separate debts of each. 
17. Both parties have incurred attorney's fees expenses and 
costs related to these proceedings and Defendant is not in a 
financial position to contribute to Plaintiff's litigation expen-
ses. 
18. Defendant has in his possession for repair a bicycle 
belonging to Jason. 
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19. Defendant is in arrears under the Court's Temporary 
Support Order in the sum of $1,100.00 for the period ending March 
26, 1985. The Court finds no basis upon which to reduce its 
Temporary Support Order as requested in Defendant's filed motion, 
dated 4 January 1985. 
20. It would be reasonable to restore to Plaintiff the use 
of her maiden name, Wendy Lynn Persch. 
21. The Court finds that unusually severe emotional and 
psychological stress and conflict has come to exist between the 
parties since their separation and that it is likely to continue 
and to be detrimental unless each party is restrained and enjoined 
from harassing, annoying or in any way interfering with the other. 
Prom the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties, their chil-
dren and the properties acquired during their marriage identified 
in the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
2. Plaintiff should be granted a judgment and decree of 
divorce from and against Defendant on the grounds of mental cruel-
ty which decree should be made final upon entry as good cause for 
waiver of the statutory interlocutory period has been shown. 
3. Plaintiff should be awarded no alimony. 
4. Plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody and control 
of the parties' four (4) minor children. 
5. Defendant should be awarded reasonable visitation rights 
with the children which, until further order of the Court, should 
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a i the Division of Family Services. Defendant should also be per-
mitted to visit wit, the children by telephone as each child « 
willing to communicate with him. 
6. Defendant should be ordered to pay Plaintiff child sup-
port in the sum or
 S150.00/»onth/child. Bach party should be 
entitled to clai* two ,2, of the children .alternate by ace, as 
L i a b l e exemptions for income tax purposes. each party shoul 
\ e ordered to carry the health, dental and accident insurance for 
the benefit of the children where it is available at his/her pla 
of employment and each party to should bear one-half of any excess 
medical expenses for the chUdren not paid by such insurance 
7 The court „aKes no determination as to the le,al r19hts 
•* »«v in the real property owned by 
that the parties may have, if any, m 
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10. Defendant should be awarded the 1981 Ford truck subject 
to all debt thereon which he should pay and hold Plaintiff harm-
less from and against, 
11. The personal properties now owned by the parties which 
were acquired during their marriage should be set over and distri-
buted between them as follows: 
To Plaintiff: One wing-back chair; pigskin bench; sofa; 
two brass end tables and two brass lamps; brass fire-
place set; two love seats; dining room table and break 
front; oak kitchen table; big screen TV; chrome sofa 
table; piano; refrigerator; gas range; chest type freez-
er; microwave oven; desk with hutch top; video recorder; 
and, all other items presently in her possession not 
specifically awarded to Defendant, below. 
To Defendant: One wing-back chair; ottoman; Doxey oil 
painting; water color painting; console TV set; firearms 
(410 pistol, .32 cal. pistol, .44 cal. pistol, .357 pis-
tol; 20 ga. shotgun and 30-30 rifle); and, all other 
items in his possession not specifically awarded to 
Plaintiff, above. 
All photographs should be divided equally. The parties 
should flip a coin to see who makes the first selection and then 
selections should alternate until all are chosen. Either party 
desiring a copy of any photograph in the possession of the other 
should pay for the cost of copying. 
12. The personal property items identified by the Court in 
Paragraph 14 of its Findings, above, should be recognized and 
declared to be, and remain, the separate property of each. 
13. The obligations and debts outstanding against the par-
ties, or either of them, identified in Paragraph 15 of the Court's 
Findings, above, should be assumed and paid by them in the follow-
ing manner: 
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By Plaintiff: Valley Bank (Ramcharger loan); Valley 
Bank (Visa Card); Salt Lake Surgical Center; Dr. 
Borgoyne; and one-half Utah Bank & Trust loan (1983 
income taxes) and 1983 income tax assessment. 
By Defendant: Zions Bank (truck loan); Bartile truck 
loan; Mervyn ' s; Salt Lake Clinic and Bryner Clinic; and 
one-half Utah Bank & Trust loan (1983 income taxes) and 
1983 income tax assessment. 
14. Any debts incurred by either party separately since 
their July 1984 separation should be assumed and paid by each as 
his/her separate debt and each should be ordered to hold the other 
harmless therefrom. 
15. All interest in the Desk & Chairsf Inc., retirement 
account should be set over and awarded to Defendant and he should 
be ordered to hold Plaintiff harmless from and against any claim 
related thereto or arising therefrom. 
16. Defendant should be ordered to return Jason's bicycle to 
Plaintiff for the child's use. 
17. All children's furniture should be awarded to Plaintiff 
for the use and benefit of the parties' children. 
18. Defendant's Motion to Reduce Temporary Supportf dated 4 
January 1985, should be denied. 
19. Plaintiff should be given and granted judgment against 
Defendant for child support arrearages accrued under the Court's 
Temporary Support Order through March 26, 1985, in the sum of 
$1,100.00. 
20. Each party should be permanently restrained and enjoined 
from harassing, annoying or in any way interfering with the other. 
21. The use of Plaintiff's maiden name, Wendy Lynn Persch, 
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22. Each party should be ordered to pay his/her own expenses 
of this litigation, including attorney's fees and court costs. 
DATED this ^ O day of April, 1985. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED as t o fo rm: 
DEAN SECONDER 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Clw* 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Attorney for Defendant 
6y ,,{p1\/hj<lA l^fy^fi^ 
Oeputy Clef* *tr 
^ 
,-\«w 
Gary L. Paxtorf, £2548 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
77 West 200 South'", Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, ftt^ah 84101 
Telephone: (801* '3,2Z-2516 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH J3J. J97 ffp , 3*3*-
WENDY LYNN HERMANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TERRY W. HERMANSEN, 
Defendant. 
5 Vy -#:T- //;*? 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D84-2532 
c^^?77 
THIS ACTION came on regularly for trial before the Honorable 
Dean E. Conder, District Judge, on February 21, 1985, at the hour 
of 10:00 o'clock a.m. The parties were present and represented by 
their counsels of record, Gary L. Paxton and E.H. Fankhauser. 
Thereupon, preliminary statements were made to the Court after 
which Plaintiff and witnesses on her behalf were called to testify 
and cross-examined and exhibits were admitted into evidence after 
which she rested. Defendant then testified on his own behalf and 
additional exhibits were admitted into evidence and he rested. 
The Court then announced certain findings and invited the parties 
to submit written proposals for resolution of the remaining issues 
joined in the action, and the parties having submitted memoranda 
and the Court having reviewed the same and having considered the 
evidence introduced at trial and having issued its Memorandum 
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14. All interest in the Desk & Chairs, Inc., retirement 
account is hereby set over and awarded to Defendant and he is 
ordered to hold Plaintiff harmless from and against any claim 
related thereto or arising therefrom. 
15. Defendant is ordered to return Jason's bicycle to Plain-
tiff for the child's use. 
16. All children's furniture is awarded to Plaintiff for the 
use and benefit of the parties' children. 
17. Plaintiff is given and granted judgment against 
Defendant for child support arrearages accrued under the Court's 
Temporary Support Order through March 26, 1985, in the sum of 
$1,110.00. 
18. Each party is permanently restrained and enjoined from 
harassing, annoying or in any way interfering with the other. 
19. The use of Plaintiff's maiden name, Wendy Lynn Persch, 
is hereby restored to her. 
20. Defendant's Motion to Reduce Temporary Support, dated 4 
January 1985, is hereby denied. 
21. Each party is hereby ordered to pay and discharge his/ 
her own expenses of this litigation, including attorney's fees and 
costs. 
MADE AND ENTERED this <£ (J day of April, 1985. 
BY"THE COURT 
<0£ JU-* 
DEAN E.^C0NDER 
DistrictTJudge 
APPROVED as to form; ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINOCSY 
E. H. FANKHAUSEK nv WkkL •'^UlTg 
To Defendant: One wing-back chair; ottoman; Doxey oil 
painting; water color painting; console TV set; firearms 
(410 pistol, .32 cal. pistol, .44 cal. pistol, .357 
pistol; 20 ga. shotgun and 30-30 rifle); and, all other 
items in his possession not specifically awarded to 
Plaintiff, above. 
All photographs are to be divided equally. The parties shall 
flip a coin to see who makes the first selection and then 
selections will alternate until all are chosen. Either party 
desiring a copy of any photograph selected by the other is to pay 
for the cost of copying. 
11. The personal property items identified by the Court in 
Paragraph 14 of its Findings of Fact, are hereby recognized and 
declared to be, and remain, the separate property of each. Each 
party is ordered to deliver to the other any such items in his/ 
her possession or under his/her control belonging to the other* 
12. The obligations and debts outstanding against the par-
ties, or either of them, identified in Paragraph 15 of the Court's 
Findings of Fact are to be assumed and paid by them in the follow-
ing manner: 
By Plaintiff: Valley Bank (Ramcharger loan); Valley 
Bank (Visa Card); Salt Lake Surgical Center; Dr. 
Borgoyne; and one-half Utah Bank & Trust loan (1983 
income taxes) and 1983 income tax assessment. 
By Defendant: Zions Bank (truck loan); Bartile truck 
loan; Mervyn's; Salt Lake Clinic and Bryner Clinic; and 
one-half Utah Bank & Trust loan (1983 income taxes) and 
1983 income tax assessment. 
13. Any debts incurred by either party separately since 
their July 1984 separation are to be assumed and paid by each as 
his/her separate debt and each is ordered to hold the other harm-
less therefrom. 
6. Any and all equity or interest that the parties may 
have or own in the real property located at 2315 Sheridan 
Road, Salt Lake Cityf Utah, is hereby awarded and distributed 
to Plaintiff subject to her payment of any and all obligations 
the parties may owe thereon and subject to her holding the 
Defendant harmless therefrom. 
7. Any and all equity or interest the parties may have 
or own in the Bitner property at Park City, Utah, is hereby 
awarded and distributed to the Defendant subject to his paying 
any and all obligations thereon and holding the Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
8. Plaintiff is awarded the 1979 Dodge Ramcharger sub-
ject to the Valley Bank lien thereon which she is ordered to 
pay and to hold Defendant harmless from and against. 
9. Defendant is awarded the 1981 Ford truck subject to 
all debt thereon which he is ordered to pay and to hold Plain-
tiff harmless from and against. 
10. The personal properties now owned by the parties 
which were acquired during their marriage are hereby set over 
and distributed between them as follows: 
To Plaintiff: One wing-back chair; pigskin bench; 
sofa; two brass end tables and two brass lamps? 
brass fireplace set; two love seats; dining room 
table and break front; oak kitchen table; big screen 
TV; chrome sofa table; piano; refrigerator; gas 
range; chest type freezer; microwave oven; desk with 
hutch top; video recorder; and, all other items 
presently in her possession not specifically awarded 
to Defendant, below. 
Decision and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and good cause appearing 
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the foregoing and upon motion of 
Plaintiff's counsel 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Wendy L. Hermansen is granted a judgment and 
decree of divorce from and against Defendant Terry W. Hermansen 
which decree shall become final and absolute upon entry hereof. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded no alimony. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control of the 
parties' four (4) minor children, Isha, Jeremiah, Justin and Jason 
Hermansen. 
4. Defendant is awarded reasonable visitation rights which, 
until further order of the Court, are limited in that they are to 
be exercised only under supervision at the offices of the Division 
of Family Services. Defendant is also to be permitted to visit 
with the children by telephone as each child is willing to commun-
icate with him. 
5. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay Plaintiff child sup-
port in the sum of $150.00/month/child. Each party is granted the 
right to claim two (2) of the children (alternating by age) as 
allowable exemptions for income tax purposes. Each party is 
ordered to carry the health, dental and accident insurance for the 
benefit of the children where it is available at his/her place of 
employment and each party is ordered to bear one-half of any ex-
cess medical expenses for the children not paid by such insurance. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND 
AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE 
Civil No. D84-2532 
Judge Conder 
Defendant, Terry Hermansen, by and through his attorney, 
E. H. Fankhauser, moves this Court for a new trial on the issue of 
division of real property, to-wit: The equity in the home and 
residence of the parties in the approximate sum of $85,000.00; 
and the assumption of debts and obligations by Defendant relating 
to property awarded Defendant; and for amendment of the Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce entered by the Court to the effect of award-
ing Defendant one-half (1/2) of the equity in and to the marital 
residence of the parties in that the Court abused its discretion 
in refusing to allow Defendant to testify as to the value of the 
residence; in failing to award Defendant a fair and equitable portion 
of the equity interest of the parties in said home and real property; 
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and in awarding Defendant interest in real property subjeer to 
alleged debts and obligations that would in effect diminish any award 
of property or assets to Defendant. 
The award of all equity in and to the home and residence 
to Plaintiff is excessive and appears to have been awarded under 
the influence of passion or prejudice. The award of all equity 
in the marital home and residence to Plaintiff is contrary to 
principals of equity in domestic matters and is an abuse of the 
Courts discretion. 
DATED this ^ day of May, 198 5. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed to Gary L. Paxton, Attorney for Plaintiff, 77 West 200 South, 
Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this ^ day of 
May, 1985. 
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DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED PROPERTY SETTLEMENT 
DISTRIBUTION 
TOTAL WENDY TERRY 
SIDENCE: 
st. Mkt. Value 110,000.00 
ess Mtg (Valley Bank) (7,000.00) 
ess Contract - Persch (18,000.00) 
GROSS EQUITY 85,000.00 42,500.00 42,500.00 
laintiff awarded possession and use 
subject to indebtedness. Equity 
divided equally 1/2 each party. 
Defendant's equity payable on 
usual event of remarriage, sale, 
etc., Defendant to have lien for 
his share of equity 
JTOMOBILES: 
(A) 1979 Dodge Ram Charger 6,000.00 
Loan balance (11/84) (1,200.00) 
4,800.00 
(B) 1981 Ford Pickup 7,200.00 
Loan balance (11/84) 7,200.00 
0 
OTE: 
Defendant paid $4,000.00 down on 
19 79 Dodge from funds owned 
before marriage. Plaintiff 
awarded Dodge in lieu of any 
interest in Defendant's 
Retirement account. 1981 Ford 
pickup bought by Defendant after 
parties separated July, 1984 
Defendant awarded Ford 
'URNITURE, ETC. 
(A) Awarded Plaintiff per Schedule 
(B) Awarded Defendant per Schedule 
3ITNER PROPERTY (1/6 Interest 10 Acres) 
Est. Present Value 20,000.00 
l/6th Interest 3,333.00 
Less amount owed or 
assessments (Disputed) (2667.00) 
566.00 666.00 666.00 
\nv and all interest awarded 
4,800.00 
0 
4,615.00 
2,170.00 
DISTRIBUTION 
TOTAL WENDY TERRY 
]TIREMENT ACCOUNT: 
'DC/D&C INC. 
p^prox Present Value 5,000.00 5,000.00 
til awarded Defendant in lieu 
of interest in 79 Dodge 
and furniture disparity 
TOTALS $ 51,915.00 $ 50,336.00 
SCHEDULE OF FURNITURE AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 
VALUE 
Each party awarded personal property owned 
before marriage 
(A) Plaintiff; Refrigerator, Zenith TV, sofa and 
coffee table, Antique dining room set with 
chairs, 410 Shotgun, 22 Cal, Pistol, children's 
furniture 
(B) Defendant: Furniture in possession, 12 gauge 
Shotgun (single shot), 12 gauge Remington 
(Model II) Shotgun, 22 caliber Automatic 
Pistol 
Furniture and personal property acquired during 
marriage awarded to Plaintiff 
1 Wing Back Chair 
Pig Skin Bench 
Sofa (wedding gift) 
2 Brass end tables ($100 each) 
2 Brass lamps ($20 each) 
Brass fireplace set 
2 Love seats (joint gift - $50 each) 
Dining room Table and Breakfront (gift) 
Oak kitchen table w/ 4 chairs 
Big Screen TB (on loan - FDC) 
Chrome Sofa Table 
Children's bedroom furniture 
Piano (joint gift - Def. paid $200 downpayment) 
Refrigerator 
Gas Range (1 yr old) 
Freezer (chest) 
Microwave Oven (needs repair) 
Desk w/ Hutch top 
Video Recorder (J.V.C.) 
Total to Plaintiff 
I. Furniture and personal property to be 
awarded to Defendant 
1 Wing Back chair 500-00 
1 Ottoman 200.00 
1 Oil painting (Doxey) 500,00 
1 Water color painting 20.00 
TV Set (console) (needs repair) 150.00 
500. 
350. 
200. 
200. 
40 . 
150. 
100. 
25 . 
100. 
800. 
900 . 
300. 
350. 
150 . 
450 . 
4 , 6 1 5 , 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
,00 
,00 
,00 
,00 
VALUE 
Furniture awarded Defendant - Cont. 
1 410 Thompson Pistol 150.00 
1 32 Cal. Pistol Colt (sold) 50.00 
1.44 Cal. Ruger (sold) 75.00 
1 357 Smith-Wesson (sold) 175.00 
1 Remington 20 Gauge Shotgun (sold) 250.00 
1 Winchester 30-30 Rifle (sold) 100.00 
Total to Defendant $2,170.00 
VESTED TERMINATION BENEFITS 
for 
TERRY HERMANSEN 
D E S K S & C H A I R S , I N C . 
E M P L O Y E E S ' P E N S I O N T R U S T 
DATE OF TERMINATION: 01-15-84 
VESTED PERCENTAGE: 100% 
LOAN NOTE: $ 1,570 * 
(Principal & Interest 9 12%) 
CHECKING ACCOUNT: 334 
PAYABLE TO PLAN: 2,488 
LIFE INSURANCE CASH VALUE: 261 
TOTAL VESTED BENEFIT: $ 4,653 
LESS LOAN: 1,570 
PAYABLE FROM TRUST TO TERRY: $ 3,083 
* FDC has loan which should be paid directly to Terry from FDC. 
